Vincent Heddesheimer

I am a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Politics at Princeton University. I study political economy with a focus on the political causes and consequences of economic inequality and insecurity.

1. The Green Transition and Political Polarization Along Occupational Lines (with Hanno Hilbig and Erik Voeten). Forthcoming, American Political Science Review. [Abstract]

   Green transition policies set long-term targets to reduce carbon emissions and other pollutants, posing a threat to workers in polluting occupations and communities reliant on these occupations. Can far right parties attract voters who anticipate losing from the green transition? We explore this in Germany, which has ambitious green policies and a large workforce in polluting occupations. The far right AfD started campaigning as the only party opposing green transition policies in 2016. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show AfD support increased in counties with more polluting jobs after this platform change. A panel survey further demonstrates that individuals in these occupations also shifted towards the AfD. Probing mechanisms, we find suggestive evidence that growing far right support is due to changing perceptions of social stigma and lower status. Our results highlight the need for a new research agenda on a backlash against the normative dimension of the green transition.

2. Climate Exposure Drives Firm Political Behavior: Evidence from Earnings Calls and Lobbying Data (with Christian Baehr and Fiona Bare). Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science. [Abstract]

   When and how do firms engage in climate politics? We argue that regulatory concerns, business opportunities, and physical risks activate policy preferences and lobbying efforts. We measure firm-level exposure to opportunity, regulatory, and physical aspects of climate change based on discussion in quarterly earnings call transcripts for 11,705 publicly traded firms between 2001 and 2023. We estimate the effect of climate exposure on climate lobbying instances (extensive margin), amount (intensive margin), and targets (political entities). We find that more exposed companies, especially in terms of opportunities and regulation, are more likely to lobby. The type of climate exposure, both absolute and relative to industry peers, dictates whether firms lobby, how much they spend on lobbying, and their choice of government target. Taken together, our findings demonstrate the importance of disaggregating firm-level perceptions of climate impacts to understand patterns in political activity.

3. GERDA: German Election Database (with Hanno Hilbig, Florian Sichart, and Andreas Wiedemann). 2025. Nature: Scientific Data, 12: 618. [Abstract] [Website] [Data] [R Package] [Preprint]

   Elections are the key mechanism through which voters hold elected officials accountable. The partisan composition of local, state, and federal governments, in turn, shapes policy choices and public goods provision. Yet studying representation, government responsiveness, and partisan politics across multiple levels of government—especially at the local level—has been difficult due to inconsistently reported, incomplete, or insufficiently harmonized election data at small geographic scales. This paper introduces GERDA (https://www.german-elections.com/), a panel dataset of local, state, and federal election results in Germany at the municipality level spanning the past three decades. GERDA includes turnout and vote shares for all major parties and resolves challenges arising from municipal boundary changes and joint mail-in voting districts, yielding a consistent panel of municipalities in their 2021 boundaries. We also provide municipal and county boundary shapefiles to facilitate spatial analyses. Our dataset enables new research on partisan politics, policy responsiveness, and political representation at fine-grained geographic scales and over time.

1. Place-Based Policies, Local Responses, and Electoral Behavior (with Hanno Hilbig and Andreas Wiedemann). [Abstract]

   Place-based economic policies are increasingly seen as instruments to counter political discontent in economically-depressed regions. Do regional investment subsidies affect electoral behavior? We evaluate this question in the context of Germany's largest regional investment program. Our identification strategy leverages a 2014 subsidy rate cut for manufacturing firms that - due to EU rules - was exogenous to local economic trends. The subsidy cut reduced voting for the far-right AfD and increased support for the incumbent Christian Democrats. We then demonstrate that subsidy cuts trigger two counterreactions: local firms invest more in human capital and local governments invest more in infrastructure and public goods. We argue that these dynamics signal to voters that local governments are responsive and care about their constituents, undermining populist appeals. Our findings suggest that political consequences of place-based policies - and austerity more broadly - cannot be understood without considering counteractions by local firms and governments.

2. Housing Populism Under Financialized Capitalism (with Rafaela Dancygier and Andreas Wiedemann). (draft available upon request) [Abstract]

   This paper examines the rise of housing populism -- narratives portraying financial investors as predatory and harmful, and promoting policies such as investor bans. We argue that politicians embrace housing populism not because it reflects economic realities, but because it aligns with public sentiment: distrust of finance capitalism and belief in housing as a right. First, using US property-level transaction data (2000–2019), a difference-in-differences analysis finds no consistent evidence that investor activity increases housing costs. Second, original surveys nonetheless reveal widespread, bipartisan perceptions of predation and support for government protection of housing access. Third, a candidate choice experiment demonstrates that candidates advocating investor bans framed in anti-elite or rights-based terms outperform those prioritizing home-building through pragmatic or market-oriented appeals. Housing populism -- rooted in moral opposition to finance capitalism and endorsement of state intervention -- can divert policy from viable solutions toward symbolic confrontations between ``the people'' and financial elites.

3. Rent Control Turns Tenants into Market Liberals (with Anselm Hager). (draft available upon request) [Abstract]

   High rents have become a major political battleground in Western cities, prompting politicians to implement rent control. While rent control provides immediate relief, it lowers long-term housing supply. How do voters deal with this trade-off? We argue that rent control leads voters to become skeptical of interventionist politics. First, rent control reduces housing supply, which undermines citizen confidence in the state's capacity to correct market failures. Second, rent control benefits higher-income tenants, thus eroding trust in the state's ability to redistribute fairly. Drawing on two quasi-experimental designs from Germany, we show that beneficiaries of rent control express lower support for state intervention, weaker demand for redistribution, and greater backing for a pro-market party. These findings underscore how poorly designed policies can backfire, undermining political support among the very groups they intend to help.

4. Long-run Political Change after the Great Recession (with Hanno Hilbig). (draft available upon request) [Abstract]

   What are the long-term political consequences of economic crises? We assess the enduring impact of the Great Recession on U.S. political outcomes. We employ a difference-in-differences approach, leveraging geographic variation in unemployment shocks. Contrary to claims that major recessions primarily boost anti-incumbent, far-right candidates, we find that counties more severely affected by the recession experienced a sustained increase in Democratic vote shares, particularly in Congressional elections. These effects persisted for at least 10 years. We demonstrate that these results are unlikely to be due to persistent economic decline, demographic changes, shifts in candidate ideology, or fiscal compensation spending. Instead, survey evidence suggests that the recession lowered expectations for upward mobility, likely increasing support for redistribution and thereby benefiting Democratic candidates. Our findings expand the literature by showing that (i) severe economic shocks do not necessarily favor right-wing populists, and (ii) major downturns can continue to influence electoral outcomes long after direct economic consequences have subsided.

5. The Polarization of the Immigration Debate: Evidence from 9 National Parliaments (with Ran Abramitzky, Leah Boustan, Rafaela Dancygier, and Ahra Wu). (draft available upon request) [Abstract]

   We analyze parliamentary speeches about immigration from 9 countries using large language models. Contrary to common perception, US immigration politics are not as negative as Trump's rhetoric suggests: Democrats are the most positive party on immigration in our sample, and Republicans resemble European center-right parties rather than the far-right, focusing on crime and legality rather than economic issues. Trump is an outlier among US presidents. European mainstream parties maintained a positive consensus on immigration through 2014 and only began polarizing after the refugee crisis. This pattern suggests mainstream parties stayed positive longer than public attitudes warranted, creating space for far-right growth.

6. Economic Insecurity Increases Affective Polarization and Outgroup-Aversion (with Joanna Bryson). [Abstract]

   Affective polarization - a deep emotional divide between opposing social and political groups - has become a pressing global governance challenge, disrupting both democratic processes and policy uptake. While some degree of position polarization should be expected in a healthy, multi-party political system, the factors driving recent extremes in divisions remain unclear. One candidate factor, economic instability, has been frequently linked to rising polarization, but causal evidence to date has been limited. Using panel survey data from the Netherlands and a difference-in-differences design, we show that economic insecurity significantly increases affective polarization. The effect persists for years, with a longer (though slower) expression among men. It is also accompanied by increased distrust and social group clustering. Our findings suggest that economic insecurity is a key driver of polarization, highlighting the role of labor market stability in shaping political and social cohesion.

• GERDA - the German Election Database (with Hanno Hilbig, Florian Sichart, and Andreas Wiedemann) is a comprehensive panel dataset of local, state, and federal election results in Germany at the municipality level spanning the past three decades. It includes turnout and vote shares for all major parties, with consistent municipal boundaries and harmonized data across different levels of government. [Data] [R Package] [Paper]